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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 The question presented is whether mortgages held by the FDIC 
can be extinguished without the FDIC's consent through 
foreclosure of plaintiff's superior real estate tax liens.  We 
hold that the district court correctly interpreted and applied 12 
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) to protect the FDIC's lien interest from 
foreclosure.  Additionally, we hold that the Tax Injunction Act 
does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over this 
action and that the delay in the enforcement of plaintiff's tax 
lien does not presently rise to the level of a compensable 
taking.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. 
 I. 
  
 On October 26, 1990, Betty Simon ("plaintiff") purchased the 
tax title to a parcel of New Jersey real estate (hereinafter the 
"Cebrick Property") by paying the sum of $4,801.37.  Plaintiff 
subsequently purchased tax lien certificates for 1991, 1992, and 
1993 for that property.  At the time plaintiff purchased the tax 
lien certificates, the First National Bank of Toms River, New 
Jersey (the "Bank") held mortgage liens against the Cebrick 
Property.  The loans were made respectively in March 1987 for 
$200,000 and in August 1987 for $330,000.  On May 22, 1991, the 
Comptroller of Currency closed the Bank.  The Bank's assets were 
taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (the "FDIC").  The FDIC is now the holder of the 
mortgages at issue in its capacity as receiver for the Bank.  In 
1993, the market value of the Cebrick Property, based upon 
plaintiff's valuation, was $251,328.54. 
 Under New Jersey law, plaintiff's tax liens are superior in 
right to the FDIC's mortgage liens.  N.J.S.A. 54:5-9.  Plaintiff 
requested that the FDIC consent to foreclosure of its lien 
interest in the Cebrick Property, and the FDIC refused.  
Thereafter, plaintiff filed foreclosure proceedings in state 
court based upon the tax sale certificates.  The FDIC removed the 
case to federal court.   
 The district court granted the FDIC's 12(b)(6) motion for 
failure to state a claim and remanded the case to the state court 
for proceedings consistent with the dismissal of the FDIC.  
  
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.  The district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 
1819(b)(2).  We have jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 II. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court's order 
dismissing a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim.  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 
(3d Cir. 1993); Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, 
954 F.2d 869, 871 (3d Cir. 1992).  The test for reviewing a 
12(b)(6) motion is whether under any reasonable reading of the 
pleadings, plaintiff may be entitled to relief.  Holder v. City 
of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1993).  When reviewing 
such an order, we must accept as true the factual allegations in 
the complaint.  D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,     
U.S.    , 113 S.Ct. 1045 (1993); Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 
398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).  
 We have plenary review over the district court's legal 
conclusions, including the proper interpretation of a statute.  
Moody v. Sec. Pac. Business Credit, 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 
1992); Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 
1991); Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686, 689 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).  
 III. 
  
 In the instant case, the FDIC does not contest the 
municipality's authority to assess taxes against real property in 
which it has an interest, nor does it contest the superiority of 
plaintiff's tax liens over its mortgages.  See 12 U.S.C. § 
1825(b)(1) (providing that the Corporation shall be exempt from 
all state and local taxation, "except that any real property of 
the Corporation shall be subject to State, territorial, county, 
municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its 
value as real property is taxed"); N.J.S.A. 54:5-9 (declaring the 
superiority of municipal liens).  The FDIC maintains, however, 
that the express language of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) precludes 
plaintiff from extinguishing the FDIC's mortgages through 
foreclosure of the tax liens without its consent.   
 Enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), section 
1825(b)(2) provides: 
 No property of the Corporation shall be subject to 
levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale 
without the consent of the Corporation, nor shall any 
involuntary lien attach to the property of the 
Corporation. 
12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2).  The district court in the instant case 
concluded that, in light of the clear language of section 
1825(b)(2), the FDIC's mortgages must be protected from 
extinguishment through foreclosure of plaintiff's tax liens.  
Accordingly, the district court granted the FDIC's motion to 
dismiss.  We agree.    
  
 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred 
by construing the language of § 1825(b)(2) literally and in 
isolation from the remainder of the statute.  Relying on two 
additional sections of FIRREA, plaintiff argues that the FDIC has 
180 days in which to choose one of the following alternatives: 
(1) abandon its interest in the property, (2) consent to be 
foreclosed, or (3) pay the tax liens.   
 Long before the enactment of § 1825(b)(2), the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether cities had the right to assess 
taxes and enforce collection by selling properties in which the 
federal government held a mortgage.  See New Brunswick v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928).  In New Brunswick, the Supreme Court 
determined that a city could lawfully assess taxes against the 
owners of the property and enforce the collection of delinquent 
taxes by selling the owner's interest in the property.  276 U.S. 
at 555-56.  The Court held, however, that any sale of the 
property must protect the federal mortgage.  276 U.S. at 556 
(citing Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923)). 
 More recently, the Ninth Circuit in Rust v. Johnson, 597 
F.2d 174 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979), relying 
on New Brunswick, held that the Supremacy Clause prevented the 
City of Los Angeles from foreclosing a special assessment tax 
lien against property in which the Federal National Mortgage 
Association held a mortgage.  In the course of concluding that 
the city's lien could not be enforced without protecting the 
  
federal interest, the court held that the mortgage interest of 
federal instrumentalities should be treated the same as other 
property of the United States.  597 F.2d at 177. 
 When a court interprets a statute, "[i]t is not lightly to 
be assumed that Congress intended to depart from a long 
established policy."  United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 112 
S.Ct. 1351, 1355 (1992) (quoting Robertson v. Railroad Labor 
Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925)).  The New Brunswick line of cases 
exhibits a policy to protect federal mortgage interests from 
extinguishment through foreclosure of municipal tax liens.  The 
express language of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) evidences Congress' 
intent to protect the property interests of the FDIC, in 
particular, from foreclosure without their consent. 
 Other circuits have similarly interpreted and applied 12 
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2).  In Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 
215, 222 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit, relying on the 
express language of § 1825(b)(2), held that local taxing units 
could not foreclose the lien interests of the FDIC without the 
consent of the FDIC.  See also Donna Independent School Dist. v. 
Balli, 21 F.3d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that taxing 
units could not foreclose on property subject to FDIC liens 
without FDIC's consent); F.D.I.C. v. Lowery, 12 F.3d 995 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (relying on the "unassailably clear language" of 12 
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), the Tenth Circuit held that local taxing 
authorities could not sell property owned by FDIC to satisfy tax 
  
liens without FDIC's consent, even though tax liens attached 
prior to FDIC's acquisition of property), cert. denied,     U.S.    
, 114 S.Ct. 2674 (1994).  Like the district court in the instant 
case, we also find the reasoning in Matagorda persuasive.     
 Plaintiff in the instant case relies on Birdville 
Independent School v. Hurst Assoc., 806 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Tex. 
1992), in which a district court held that the phrase "property 
of the Corporation" under § 1825(b)(2) did not include lien 
interests of the Resolution Trust Corporation.  However, the 
Fifth Circuit effectively overruled Birdville in Matagorda.  See 
Matagorda, 19 F.3d at 221 (citing Birdville, 806 F. Supp. at 
127).  In Matagorda, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the lien 
interests held by the FDIC were clearly "property of the 
Corporation" as contemplated by the statute because "[i]t has 
been settled federal law since 1928 that in the context addressed 
herein, 'property' embraces both fee and lien interests." 19 F.3d 
221 (citing Clallam County, supra; New Brunswick, supra; Rust v. 
Johnson, supra) (other citations omitted).  We agree that the 
term "property" in § 1825(b)(2) encompasses all forms of interest 
in property, including mortgages and other liens.      
 Furthermore, plaintiff argues that the district court 
incorrectly interpreted and applied § 1825(b)(2) and offers an 
alternative reading of the statute.  Plaintiff stresses that a 
literal reading of the statute discourages the private purchase 
of real estate tax liens and thus interferes with municipal real 
  
estate tax collection.  Plaintiff contends that her alternative 
interpretation of § 1825(b)(2) does not interfere with the local 
real estate tax machinery.  Plaintiff proposes that we read        
§ 1825(b)(2) in conjunction with two other sections of FIRREA--    
§ 1821(d)(5)(A)-(F), the claims processing provision, and          
§ 1825(b)(1), the general exemption from taxation provision.  
  Section 1821(d)(5) sets forth the procedure for filing 
claims against an institution that has been put under FDIC 
receivership.  The statute provides that the Corporation shall 
determine within 180 days "whether to allow or disallow the claim 
and shall notify the claimant of any determination with respect 
to such claim."  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).  Section 
1825(b)(1) provides that the Corporation shall be exempt from all 
state and local taxation, "except that any real property of the 
Corporation shall be subject to State, territorial, county, 
municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its 
value as real property is taxed. . . ."  12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(1).  
Plaintiff maintains that these sections read together require 
that the FDIC choose, within 180 days, from one of the following 
alternatives: (1) abandon its interest in the property, (2) 
consent to be foreclosed, or (3) pay the tax liens.   
 First, we reject plaintiff's attempt to meld the 180-day 
time limit in the claims evaluation process with the rights of 
the FDIC under § 1825(b)(2) to withhold its consent to 
foreclosure.  The claims processing provision nowhere references 
  
§ 1825(b)(2), and § 1825(b)(2) itself contains no time limit on 
the ability of the FDIC to withhold its consent to the 
foreclosure of its rights.  To the extent that the claims process 
might apply here, it would apply only as a timeliness requirement 
for filing a judicial action challenging the denial of a claim.    
 Second, we reject plaintiff's argument based on FIRREA's 
general tax exemption provision.  Plaintiff relies on § 
1825(b)(1) which provides that the Corporation is exempt from all 
state and local taxation, except that any real property of the 
Corporation shall be subject to state and local taxation "to the 
same extent according to its value as other real property is 
taxed. . . ."  12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(1).  Plaintiff cites to cases 
interpreting statutes other than FIRREA which include the 
previously quoted phrase.  Plaintiff stresses that courts have 
interpreted this phrase as communicating Congress' intent not to 
interfere with the local real estate tax machinery.  See 
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 
(1946).  We agree with the judicial interpretations of this 
statutory phrase.  Specifically, in the case of FIRREA, § 
1825(b)(1) requires the payment of taxes on real property which 
the FDIC holds, so as not to deprive municipalities of the income 
they would have received had the property continued to be 
privately owned.  Congress, however, has also enacted a more 
specific provision providing that no property of the Corporation 
shall be subject to foreclosure without the Corporation's 
  
consent.  This is the section of FIRREA that is at issue in the 
instant case, and it is this provision on which we must focus. 
 Moreover, plaintiff cites to the recent Supreme Court 
decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,     U.S.    , 114 
S.Ct. 1757 (1994), as support for her contention that this court 
should not engage in a literal reading of § 1825(b)(2) but should 
instead look to other provisions of FIRREA and to the purpose of 
the Act.  Plaintiff argues that this court should follow the 
example of the Supreme Court in BFP and interpret a federal 
statute in a way that does not interfere with state and local 
laws governing real estate tax assessment and collection.  
However, the Supreme Court noted in BFP that it was taking into 
account the state regulatory background "[a]bsent a clear 
statutory requirement to the contrary."  BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1762.  
In the instant case, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) is a clear statutory 
requirement which prevents the FDIC's mortgages from being 
extinguished without its consent through the foreclosure of tax 
liens. 
 Plaintiff also advances the FDIC's Tax Policy Statement as 
support for her position.  Because the statute's language is 
clear, any reference to the FDIC's Tax Policy Statement is 
unnecessary.  See Matagorda, 19 F.3d at 220 (stating that it need 
not rely on FDIC's Tax Policy Statement because statute's 
language is unambiguous); cf. First State Bank v. United States, 
599 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that bank could not 
  
predicate claim on alleged violation of FDIC Manual which was 
issued only for internal operating purposes), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1013 (1980).   
 In conclusion, we reject plaintiff's alternative reading of 
12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) and affirm the district court's 
interpretation and application of the statute to protect the 
FDIC's mortgages from being extinguished without its consent 
through foreclosure of plaintiff's tax liens. 
 IV. 
 We now turn to the question of whether the Tax Injunction 
Act ("TIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, applies in the instant case to 
divest the district court of jurisdiction over this action.  The 
TIA provides that: 
 The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or 
restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax 
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 
28 U.S.C. § 1341.  Plaintiff maintains that the FDIC, by invoking 
the protection of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) in federal court, has 
restrained the collection of taxes and thus implicated the 
jurisdictional bar of the TIA.  Relying on FIRREA's state tax 
immunity provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(1), the foreclosure 
provision at issue in the instant case, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), 
and FIRREA's jurisdictional provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2), 
the FDIC contends that Congress intended to allow tax cases 
involving the FDIC to be litigated in federal court.  In essence, 
  
the FDIC argues that Congress has impliedly created an exception 
to the TIA by subsequent legislation. 
 We do not necessarily agree with plaintiff that the district 
court's application of § 1825(b)(2) to protect the mortgage 
interests of the FDIC violates the TIA because it suspends the 
collection of taxes under state law until the FDIC consents to 
foreclosure of the tax liens.  Withholding consent to foreclose 
from a private citizen does not implicate the assessment, levy, 
or collection of any tax.  The statute is intended to prevent 
interference with taxation by governmental entities; however, 
upon the sale of the tax certificate, the tax obligation is 
satisfied.  The holder's inability to foreclose does not affect 
the governmental entity's ability to assess, levy, or collect any 
tax, and thus, the TIA is not applicable.   
 We do, however, reject the FDIC's reliance on FIRREA's 
removal provision.  See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (holding 
that jurisdictional statute is insufficient by itself to 
establish implied repeal of TIA).  We also find that the express 
language of § 1825(b) is not sufficient evidence of Congress' 
intent to exempt the FDIC from the TIA.   
 We also hold that the TIA does not oust the district court 
of jurisdiction because the FDIC in these particular 
circumstances qualifies for the federal instrumentality exception 
to the TIA.  See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New Iberia, 921 
  
F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1991).  Under a judicially-created 
exception to the TIA, the United States and its instrumentalities 
can initiate actions in federal court to protect themselves from 
"unconstitutional state exactions."  See Department of Employment 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966); see also Moe v. 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. at 470.   
 Congress enacted FIRREA as part of a comprehensive federal 
program to meet a financial crisis.  The statute provides that 
the FDIC shall act as receiver for failed banking institutions.  
In its role as receiver, the FDIC's assets are protected from 
foreclosure while it is winding up the affairs of a failed 
banking institution.  12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2).  The district 
court's application of this section to protect the FDIC's lien 
interest from being foreclosed without its consent does not 
violate the TIA, even if it were applicable, because the FDIC is 
acting in a governmental capacity when it winds up the affairs of 
failed banking institutions pursuant to FIRREA.  In light of the 
governmental role played by the FDIC in the instant case, we find 
that it qualifies for the federal instrumentality exception to 
the TIA.  In sum, the TIA did not oust the district court of 
jurisdiction over this action. 
 In Bank of New England Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 986 F.2d 
600 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit held that the FDIC was not 
a federal instrumentality for purposes of the TIA.  The First 
Circuit's decision is distinguishable.  First, only state tax 
  
issues were involved in Clark; the FDIC alleged only state law 
grounds for relief.  986 F.2d at 601, n.4 602.  In contrast, the 
FDIC in the instant case has invoked the protection of a federal 
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2).  Second, in Clark the FDIC was 
the assignee of a failed bank's claim for a refund of state 
excise taxes.  986 F.2d at 601.  Thus, the FDIC's governmental 
role was minimal.  However, in the instant case, the FDIC sought 
the protection afforded by a federal statute to prevent its 
assets from being foreclosed without its consent while it 
attempted to wind up the affairs of a failed bank. 
 Similarly, the governmental role played by the FDIC in 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New York, 928 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 
1991), was also minimal, and it is on this basis that the Second 
Circuit held that the FDIC could not invoke the federal 
instrumentality exception.  In New York, the FDIC was the 
assignee of a bank's claims against a city and state for 
assessing taxes on interest payments in contravention of a 
federal statute.  Without reaching the question of whether the 
FDIC is a federal instrumentality, the court held that the FDIC 
could not invoke the exception because by bringing suit the FDIC 
was attempting to protect the interests of a commercial lending 
institution rather than the federal government.  New York, 928 
F.2d at 59. 
 In conclusion, even if the TIA were applicable, because the 
FDIC sought the protection of § 1825(b)(2) while acting in a 
  
governmental capacity, it is entitled to invoke the federal 
instrumentality exception to the TIA. 
    V. 
 For the first time in her reply brief,1 plaintiff raises the 
contention that the district court's application of 12 U.S.C. § 
1825(b)(2) works a compensable taking of her property under the 
Fifth Amendment.2  Both parties acknowledge that the statute does 
not extinguish plaintiff's tax liens nor does it subordinate them 
to the FDIC's liens.  The FDIC's withholding of their consent to 
foreclosure merely delays plaintiff's enforcement of the tax lien 
against the FDIC.  Plaintiff contends, however, that, without 
just compensation, this indeterminate delay is unconstitutional.  
 Plaintiff relies on Matagorda in which the Fifth Circuit 
confronted this precise issue.  Even though it concluded that the 
delay involved did not constitute a compensable taking, the Fifth 
                     
 
   1Where an issue is raised for the first time in a reply 
brief, we deem it insufficiently preserved for review before this 
Court.  Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation, 43 F.3d 65, 71 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. 
App. P. 28(a)(3); Third Cir. Loc. App. R. 28.1(a)(i).  In the 
instant case, we deviate from this general rule because appellee 
has addressed appellant's "takings" argument in its appellate 
brief.  Moreover, both parties addressed this issue at oral 
argument. 
    
2Plaintiff also argues that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as 
interpreted by the district court violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and her constitutional right of 
access to the courts.  We find these contentions to be without 
merit.  The "takings" issue, however, is a closer question and 
requires additional discussion. 
  
Circuit in Matagorda cautioned that "[u]nmitigated delay, coupled 
with distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at some point, 
infringe on the entire "bundle" of rights enjoyed by the 
Appellants to the point that a compensable taking occurs."  19 
F.3d at 225.  See also Donna Independent School District v. 
Balli, 21 F.3d at 101 (holding that delays in foreclosing 
property tax liens did not constitute compensable takings under 
Fifth Amendment).  We agree with the Fifth Circuit in Matagorda 
that at some point a delay in the ability to exercise property 
rights may constitute a compensable taking.   
 Furthermore, we hold that any delay should be measured from 
the point at which plaintiff could first have foreclosed under 
state law until the district court's decision.  Thus measured, 
the delay in the instant case consists of one year and seven 
months.  Plaintiff argues that this delay constitutes a taking 
for which she should receive just compensation.  The FDIC 
counters that plaintiff is being fairly compensated for the delay 
by the interest accruing at the rate of 17-18% per annum on the 
tax liens.  The FDIC also stresses that plaintiff's liens have 
priority over the FDIC's liens and that the property is much more 
valuable--10 times more valuable--than plaintiff's liens.  
Finally, the FDIC suggested at oral argument that a compensable 
taking will occur when the tax liens plus accrued interest exceed 
the fair market value of the property.   
  
 Without adopting that formula, based upon the foregoing 
facts and circumstances, we hold that plaintiff has not 
established that she is presently deprived of a sufficient 
property interest to create a compensable taking. 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed. 
